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ABSTRACT
This article traces the path from the decision of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) in Salduz v Turkey to custodial legal assistance reforms in France, Scotland,
Belgium and the Netherlands, and to the recent decision of the Irish Supreme Court
in DPP v Gormley. The article attempts to ﬂush out the central role of the ECtHR in
effecting national criminal justice reform, while paying attention to considerable vari-
ations in national responses. It discusses the thesis that when the ECtHR articulates its
rules clearly, as it has arguably done in the Salduz line of cases, it can lead contracting
parties to accept its position, even where this might require a signiﬁcant readjustment
of national law and practice. The article also brings into focus the Irish Supreme
Court’s strong demonstration of common law comparativism, which inﬂuenced the
outcome in Gormley at least as signiﬁcantly as Strasbourg jurisprudence itself. This
remarkable cosmopolitan vision is contrasted with the Supreme Court’s simultaneous
unawareness of other Salduz-generated reforms in Europe. The article concludes that
comparative law should have an important role to play in shaping national responses
to Strasbourg jurisprudence and facilitating its acceptance by contracting parties.
KEYWORDS : right to legal assistance, police custody, fair trial, comparative law, har-
monisation, Article 6 European Convention on Human Rights, Salduz v Turkey
1. INTRODUCTION
In DPP v Gormley and DPP v White, the Irish Supreme Court recognized ‘a right to
early access to a lawyer after arrest’ and a ‘right not to be interrogated without having
had an opportunity to obtain [legal] advice’.1 Gormley is the latest link in the chain
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1 [2014] IESC 17 at para 9.13. This article will discuss the appeal of Raymond Gormley. Only sporadic ref-
erence will be made to the separate but linked appeal of Craig White, where the police obtained bodily
samples for forensic testing after the suspect had requested the presence of a solicitor but before the solici-
tor concerned arrived. Contrary to Gormley’s appeal, where the Supreme Court found that a suspect is
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of radical Strasbourg-inspired reforms of the right to custodial legal assistance in
Europe. The seminal unanimous decision of the Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or ‘the Court’) in Salduz v Turkey,2 which was a
major influence for Gormley, had already led to, or set in motion at least, reforms of
custodial legal assistance in France, Belgium, Scotland and the Netherlands. Like
Ireland, these countries had long resisted giving full effect to the right of access to a
lawyer in police interrogations. Scotland and Belgium were going so far as denying
suspects the right to consult with a lawyer before interrogation, while suspects in
France and the Netherlands were entitled to a brief consultation with a lawyer prior
to, but not during, questioning.3 Irish jurisprudence was recognizing access to a law-
yer as a constitutional right,4 but did not ‘require that advice from a requested solici-
tor actually be made available to the relevant suspect prior to questioning’5 and
rejected the possibility of having a lawyer present during questioning.6
In undertaking a contextual study of reforms of custodial legal assistance in
Europe, this article will offer evidence of the central role of the ECtHR in effecting
change in national jurisdictions. At the same time, it will highlight considerable vari-
ations in national responses to Salduz, and will argue that these illustrate that cosmo-
politan influences for reform are mediated by competing judicial and legislative
agendas, local resistance and a variety of other political, institutional and economic
factors. The article will use these observations as a platform to discuss, and then pro-
pose qualifications to, the thesis that when the ECtHR articulates its rules clearly, it
can lead contracting parties to accept its position. Reflecting on the Irish Supreme
Court’s striking demonstration of common law comparativism in Gormley, the article
will also offer some thoughts on the role that comparative law should play in shaping
national responses to Strasbourg jurisprudence.
2 . STRASBOURG JURISPRUDENCE AND NATIONAL REFORMS OF
THE RIGHT TO CUSTODIAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
To explore Strasbourg’s role in reforms of the right of access to a lawyer in Europe,
I will provide a sketch of the state of custodial legal assistance before and after
entitled to prior legal advice in cases of interrogation, in relation to White’s appeal the Court held that
there is no such entitlement in cases of forensic testing. Though the case of White merits attention, it is the
case of Gormley that is of particular comparative interest for the analysis of similar jurisprudence and ensu-
ing legal reforms in the other European legal systems discussed in this article.
2 Application No 36391/02, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 27 November 2008.
3 See generally Brants, ‘The Reluctant Dutch Response to Salduz’ (2011) 15 Edinburgh Law Review 298;
Spencer, ‘Strasbourg and Defendants’ Rights in Criminal Procedure’ (2011) 70 Cambridge Law Journal 14;
Questiaux, ‘Much Ado About Justice’ (2011) 15 Edinburgh Law Review 432; Committee against Torture,
Follow-up replies from the Government of Belgium to the Concluding Observations of the Committee
against Torture, 28 March 2011, CAT/C/BEL/CO/2/Add.1, at para 74; Dorange and Field, ‘Reforming
Defence Rights in French Police Custody: A Coming Together in Europe?’ (2012) 16 International Journal
of Evidence and Proof 153; Verhoeven and Stevens, ‘The Lawyer in the Dutch Interrogation Room:
Influence on Police and Suspect’ (2012) 9 Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling 69;
Giannoulopoulos, ‘ “North of the Border and Across the Channel”: Custodial Legal Assistance Reforms in
Scotland and France’ [2013] Criminal Law Review 369.
4 See DPP v Healy [1990] 2 IR 73.
5 Gormley, supra n 1 at para 5.7.
6 See Lavery v Member in Charge, Carrickmacross Garda Station [1999] 2 IR 390; and JM v Member in Charge
of Coolock Garda Station [2013] IEHC 251.
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Salduz in the five European countries that will be compared in this article. It will first
be necessary to offer a brief account of Salduz and its progeny, and a more detailed
analysis of the most recent demonstration of their effect, namely the Irish Supreme
Court’s decision in Gormley.
A. Salduz and its Progeny
Salduz represents a major re-evaluation of the ECtHR’s position on the importance
of ‘the investigation stage for the preparation of the criminal proceedings’.7 The sus-
pect in Salduz was a minor of 17-years-of-age who had been interrogated at an anti-
terrorism branch of the Turkish police in the absence of a lawyer, making several
admissions about his involvement in the suspected offences. The case was first exam-
ined by a Chamber of the ECtHR, which found no violation of the right to fair trial,
mainly on the basis that the applicant had had legal representation during the trial
and appeal proceedings, his statement was not the sole basis for conviction and he
had had the opportunity of challenging the prosecution’s allegations. The fairness of
the trial had, therefore, not been prejudiced by the lack of custodial legal assistance.8
This finding was in line with the pre-Salduz approach of assessing fairness with
regard to the entirety of the proceedings.9 The Grand Chamber’s decision in Salduz
departed from this approach altogether, holding that Article 6(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights10 (ECHR or ‘the Convention’) requires that ‘as a
rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect
by the police’11 and that ‘[t]he rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably
prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation without
access to a lawyer are used for a conviction.’12 The Court rejected the argument that
the assistance provided subsequently by a lawyer or the adversarial nature of the
ensuing proceedings could cure the defects occurring during police custody.13
The ECtHR provided quick confirmation of this new approach in a series of
Chamber judgments. In Panovits v Cyprus,14 it reiterated that ‘Article 6 requires that
the accused be given the benefit of the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial
stages of police interrogation’,15 and then considerably extended the scope of the
application of the right to legal assistance in Dayanan v Turkey, which mandated that
a suspect should be assisted by a lawyer ‘as soon as he or she is taken into cus-
tody . . . and not only while being questioned’, and that he should be able to ‘obtain
the whole range of services specifically associated with legal assistance’.16 The right
7 Salduz, supra n 2 at para 54. But see Ashworth, who notes that ‘[i]n one sense, the judgment can be seen
as a continuation of a development [by the ECtHR] of the right to access to legal advice’: Ashworth,
‘Case Comment – Salduz v Turkey: Human Rights – Article 6 – right to fair trial’ [2010] Criminal Law
Review 419 at 420.
8 Salduz v Turkey Application No 36391/02, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 26 April 2007, at paras 23–24.
9 See Salduz, supra n 2 at para 48.
10 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, ETS 5.
11 Salduz, supra n 2 at para 55.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. at para 58.
14 Application No 4268/04, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 11 December 2008.
15 Ibid. at para 66.
16 Application No 7377/ 03, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 13 October 2009, at para 32.
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of access to a lawyer was seen as extending beyond the right to legal advice, to
include a wider notion of legal assistance that applies during the entire interrogation
phase and not simply prior to, or during, the questioning of the suspect.17 The
Court likewise found a breach of the right to fair trial in Pishchalnikov v Russia, where
the suspect had been questioned in the absence of a lawyer in the first two days of
interrogation, though he had specifically asked to be assisted by a lawyer.18 The
Court held that the authorities should have offered the suspect the opportunity to
retain a counsel even if the one originally requested by him was unavailable.19 The
Court concluded that the lack of legal assistance had irretrievably affected the right
to a fair trial,20 and that an accused ‘who had expressed his desire to participate in in-
vestigative steps only through counsel, should not be subject to further interrogation
by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him’.21 Finally, in Brusco v
France, the ECtHR removed any doubts about the lawyer’s presence at questioning,
by holding that the defendant has the right to be assisted by a lawyer from the begin-
ning of his detention as well as during questioning.22
The Salduz line of jurisprudence continues to evolve at a very fast pace23 and to
exert considerable influence in European countries. Gormley is the last of radical
developments in this area. After presenting the case, I will demonstrate that it reflects
a trend of breathing new life into the right to custodial legal assistance in those
European jurisdictions that had long failed to recognize a role for lawyers at the
police station.
B. Salduz Strikes Again: DPP v Gormley
The appellant in Gormley had requested a solicitor shortly after being arrested and
being notified of his rights, and had provided the police with the names of two solici-
tors. The gardaı´ (officers of the Irish national police) made efforts to locate either
one of the two solicitors. One of them contacted the Garda station less than an hour
later, to confirm he would soon arrive at the station. But the gardaı´ did not wait for
the solicitor and started the interview immediately after he made contact with
them.24 It is in the course of this interview that the suspect made a number of
17 For a discussion of the distinction between the right to legal advice and the right to legal assistance, see
Leverick, ‘The Right to Legal Assistance During Detention’ (2011) 15 Edinburgh Law Review 352 at 354.
18 Application No 7025/04, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 24 September 2009.
19 Ibid. at para 74.
20 Ibid. at para 91.
21 Ibid. at para 79.
22 Application No 1466/07, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 14 October 2010, at para 45. See also Boz v Turkey
Application No 2039/04, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 9 February 2010; and Adamkiewicz v Poland
Application No 54729/00, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 2 March 2010. In Navone and Others v Monaco
Applications Nos 62880/11, 62892/11 and 62899/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 24 October 2013, at
para 79, the ECtHR observed that it had on many occasions specified that the right to legal assistance
during police detention should be particularly understood as assistance ‘during questioning’, citing the ex-
amples of Karabil v Turkey Application No 5256/02, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 16 June 2009, at para
44; U¨mit Aydin v Turkey Application No 33735/02, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 5 January 2010, at para
47; and Boz v Turkey Application No 2039/04, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 9 February 2010 at para 34.
23 See generally Choo, The Privilege against Self-Incrimination and Criminal Justice (2013) at 84–6.
24 The appellant made the request for a solicitor at 2.15 p.m., and the solicitor contacted the Garda station
at 3.06 p.m. to inform them he would attend the station ‘shortly after’ 4 p.m. or ‘as soon as possible after’
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inculpatory admissions which were deemed admissible in trial. The Supreme Court
was thereupon faced with the question whether commencement of the questioning
should be postponed to enable the solicitor to attend at the Garda station or whether
simply contacting the solicitor vindicates the suspect’s right to legal assistance.
Until Gormley was decided, the right of access to legal assistance was being
narrowly interpreted as a right to reasonable access only25 and was therefore of ‘lim-
ited practical effect’.26 The gardaı´’s ‘bona fide attempts to comply with [the suspect’s]
request [for legal assistance]’ seemed to satisfy this requirement, unless it could be
demonstrated that the gardaı´ had made a conscious and deliberate attempt to
deprive the suspect of the services of his solicitor.27 But the Irish Supreme Court
said in Gormley that the Constitution’s mandate that a person should not be tried
save ‘in due course of law’28 encompassed ‘the right not to be interrogated without
having had an opportunity to obtain such advice’.29 This specifically derived from
the right against self-incrimination30 and was ‘an important constitutional entitle-
ment of high legal value’.31 Gormley now provides ‘an entitlement not to be interro-
gated after a request for a lawyer has been made and before that lawyer has become
available to tender the requested advice’.32 The Court emphasized that, ‘[a]t a min-
imum’, the right of access to a lawyer while in custody ‘would be significantly diluted
if questioning could continue prior to the arrival of the relevant lawyer’.33 The Court
also recognized that ‘there are many issues of detail which surround the precise
extent of such a right’34 and that the right is ‘potentially subject to exceptions’,35 but
it then went on to explain that these would be ‘extreme exceptions where the lawyer
just does not arrive within any reasonable timeframe’,36 and added that this would be
‘a matter to be debated if and when a case with those facts actually comes before the
Court’.37
4 p.m. The appellant’s interview started at 3.10 p.m. The solicitor arrived at the station at 4.48 p.m.:
Gormley, supra n 1 at paras 3.1–3.2.
25 See Section 5 Criminal Justice Act 1984; and DPP v Madden [1977] IR 336.
26 Campbell, ‘The Constitutional Right to Legal Advice after Arrest’, 7 March 2014, available at: human-
rights.ie/civil-liberties/the-constitutional-right-to-legal-advice-after-arrest/ [last accessed 24 August
2015]. Heffernan notes that the practice was ‘extremely restrictive’, as there was no duty to inform the
suspect of the right to legal assistance and ‘there could be no meaningful enjoyment of the right unless
the suspect was independently aware of his entitlement and expressly invoked it’. After DPP v Healy,
supra n 4, the duty to notify the suspect was no longer in doubt, which meant that the Irish position be-
came ‘considerably more protective’, but there were still important concerns over ‘the additional steps, if
any, that the gardaı´ [had to] take to facilitate access’: Heffernan, ‘The Right to Legal Advice, Reasonable
Access and the Remedy of Excluding Evidence’ (2011) 1 Criminal Law and Procedure Review 111 at 113.
27 DPP v Buck [2002] 2 IR 268 at 269–70. See also DPP v Conroy [1986] IR 460.
28 Article 38.1 Republic of Ireland Constitution.
29 Gormley, supra n 1 at para 9.13.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid. at para 9.14.
32 Ibid. at para 9.2.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid. at para 9.10.
37 Ibid.
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Salduz played a key role in the Irish Supreme Court’s transition from the ‘reason-
able access’ test to mandating that questioning could not commence or continue
before the arrival of a lawyer. The Court took as its point of departure the ‘general
principles’ established in Salduz, citing extensively from the decision of the Grand
Chamber,38 the ECtHR’s decisions which later reiterated and further developed
these principles,39 as well as Cadder v HM Advocate, in which the UK Supreme
Court substituted the Salduz line of jurisprudence for the pre-existing regime of
police interrogation in Scotland.40 The first question that the Irish Supreme Court
asked in Gormley was whether the entitlement to a trial in due course of law also
encompassed an entitlement to access legal advice before interrogation. Establishing
that this was the position taken by ECtHR jurisprudence, the Court responded in
the affirmative.41 This opened the way to examine the question central to Gormley of
whether this entitlement also carried with it ‘an entitlement not to be interrogated
after such access is requested and before access to such a lawyer is obtained’.42
Noting that this was indeed the ‘consistent international position’,43 which the
ECtHR had also adopted, the Court took the radical step of prohibiting the continu-
ation of questioning before legal advice being obtained.44 This was required, the
Court concluded, to compensate for the particular vulnerability of the suspect after
arrest, which was the core reasoning behind Salduz.45
Strasbourg’s key influence in Gormley also becomes evident when contrasted with
the conclusion in the linked appeal of DPP v White. The Court explained there that,
according to ECtHR case law, the taking of forensic samples without the benefit of
legal advice did not amount to a breach of the right to a fair trial.46 This meant that a
distinction could be drawn between recognizing the right to prior legal advice in
cases of police interrogation—which derived directly from Strasbourg jurispru-
dence—and rejecting the right in cases of forensic testing, in view of the fact that
such an extended application of the right to legal assistance could not be supported
by the ECHR.47
C. Before Salduz in France, Scotland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Ireland
Resistance to recognition of the right to custodial legal assistance in France is a well-
documented fact.48 I have sketched elsewhere how systemic opposition to providing
38 Ibid. at paras 6.1–6.3, citing Salduz, supra n 2 at paras 50–55 and 62.
39 Ibid. at paras 6.4–6.5, citing notably Dayanan v Turkey, supra n 16 at para 32; and Panovits v Cyprus, supra
n 14 at paras 72–73.
40 Ibid. at para 6.6, citing Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43.
41 Ibid. at paras 8.1–8.8.
42 Ibid. at para 9.1.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. at para 9.2.
45 Ibid. at para 9.9.
46 See notably Saunders v United Kingdom Application No 19187/91, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 17
December 1996; and Boyce v Ireland Application No 8428/09, Admissibility, 27 November 2012.
47 Gormley, supra n 1 at paras 10.1–10.13.
48 Hodgson’s work is testament to this. See generally Hodgson, ‘Constructing the Pre-Trial Role of the
Defence in French Criminal Procedure: An Adversarial Outsider in an Inquisitorial Process?’ (2002) 6
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 1; ‘Codified Criminal Procedure and Human Rights: Some
Observations on the French Experience’ [2003] Criminal Law Review 165 at 173; French Criminal Justice: A
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suspects with access to legal advice has spanned the French legal landscape for the
last 20 years at least,49 and have pinpointed important similarities with historic resist-
ance to the right to legal advice in Scotland.50 Here it suffices to note that despite the
many attempts at legislative reform,51 suspects in France were until the enactment of
the Law of 14 April 2011 not entitled to have a lawyer present when questioned by
the police.52 Similarly, in Scotland, it was only in 2010 that the UK Supreme Court
forced, with Cadder v HM Advocate,53 a break with a 30-year history of legislation54
and authoritative line of jurisprudence55 approving
the fact that a suspect, detained for six hours in police custody, but not
charged, did not have the right to legal assistance during that period and,
although the police had the right to put questions to the detainee, he had no
right to legal advice, including advice about whether or not he should answer
such questions.56
Lord Rodger’s historic analysis in Cadder brings to the fore the main reasons under-
pinning this quite idiosyncratic position,57 which was ‘intended to give the police—
and therefore the prosecution—an enhanced possibility of obtaining incriminating
admissions from the suspect which [could] then be deployed in evidence at his
trial’.58
In Belgium, prior to Salduz, legislation provided for legal assistance only after
interrogation by the investigating judge.59 This meant that suspects were deprived of
any access to a lawyer for the whole 24-hour period of interrogation by the police or
even on the most solemn occasion of examination by the investigating judge
Comparative Account of the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime in France (2005) at 39; and ‘Making
Custodial Legal Advice More Effective in France’ (2013) 92 Criminal Justice Matters 14. See also Field and
West, ‘Dialogue and the Inquisitorial Tradition: French Defence Lawyers in the Pre-Trial Criminal Process’
(2003) 14 Criminal Law Forum 261 at 284; and Vogler, ‘Reform Trends in Criminal Justice: Spain, France
and England & Wales’ (2005) 4 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 631 at 634.
49 Giannoulopoulos, ‘Custodial Legal Assistance and Notification of the Right to Silence in France: Legal
Cosmopolitanism and Local Resistance’ (2013) 24 Criminal Law Forum 291 at 297–302.
50 Giannoulopoulos, supra n 3 at 371–2.
51 See, for example, Loi n 93-1013 du 24 aouˆt 1993 modifiant la loi n 93-2 du 4 janvier 1993 portant
re´forme de la proce´dure pe´nale; and Loi n 2000-516 du 15 juin 2000 renforc¸ant la protection de la pre´-
somption d’innocence et les droits des victimes (Law of 15 June 2000 reinforcing the presumption of
innocence and victims’ rights).
52 Loi n 2011-392 du 14 avril 2011 relative a` la garde a` vue (Law of 14 April 2011 on the garde a` vue).
53 Supra n 40.
54 See Section 3 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980, consolidated by Section 15 Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 1995.
55 See, for example, Paton v Ritchie [2000] JC 271, [2000] SLT 239; Dickson v HM Advocate [2001] JC 203,
[2001] SLT 674; and HM Advocate v McLean [2009] HCJAC 97, [2010] SLT 73.
56 McCluskey, ‘Supreme Error’ (2011) 15 Edinburgh Law Review 276 at 276.
57 Cadder v HM Advocate, supra n 40 at paras 74–92.
58 Ibid. at para 92. For an informative summary of the Scottish position pre-Cadder, see Blackstock, ‘The Right
to Legal Assistance in Scotland’ (2013) 92 Criminal Justice Matters 12. The idiosyncratic character of the
Scottish position becomes even more evident when one contrasts it with developments south of the border,
where the right to legal consultation and right to have a lawyer present during questioning were implemented
nearly 25 years prior to them being enacted into Scottish law: see Giannoulopoulos, supra n 3 at 383.
59 Article 20 Loi du 20 juillet 1990 relative a` la de´tention pre´ventive (Law of 20 July 1990 on pre-trial detention).
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preceding the issuance of an arrest warrant.60 This practice of entirely isolating the
suspect when at the police station appears to have been so embedded in the Belgian
legal culture that even the Cour de cassation, the highest court in the land, originally
went so far as to consider that it was compatible with the Salduz jurisprudence, by
adopting the ‘overall fairness of the proceedings’ argumentation that had been expli-
citly rejected by Salduz itself.61 In choosing an arguably more resourceful defence of
the national legal practice, the Cour d’assises (mixed criminal tribunal) in Lie`ge
reached the same conclusion, by pointing out that Belgian law provided the suspect
with alternative procedural guarantees that compensated for the absence of a lawyer
during custodial interrogation.62 The decision mirrors the opinion of the Scottish
High Court of Justiciary in HM Advocate v McLean, where the practice of providing
the suspect with no access to a lawyer for a period of up to six hours was strongly
defended by the highest jurisdiction in Scotland on the premise of guarantees other-
wise available to secure a fair trial.63 This defence of the status quo was eventually
seen as flawed in both jurisdictions,64 yet still clearly demonstrates how, until Salduz,
no one seemed to think that questioning the suspect without access to legal assist-
ance could actually be in breach of the right to fair trial. From this viewpoint, Lord
Hope’s observation in Cadder that it was ‘remarkable that, until quite recently,
nobody [in Scotland had] thought that there [had been] anything wrong with this
procedure’65 applies a fortiori to Belgium, which prior to Salduz endorsed possibly
the most restrictive interpretation of the right to legal assistance in Europe.
60 ‘The man who appears before the investigating judge is alone, he does not have the right to a lawyer’,
noted Ce´cile Thibaut in an amendment to the Bill reforming custodial legal assistance: see Document
le´gislatif n 4-1079/2, Proposition de loi modifiant l’article 1er de la loi du 20 juillet 1990 relative a` la
de´tention pre´ventive, afin de confe´rer de nouveaux droits, au moment de l’arrestation, a` la personne pri-
ve´e de liberte´.
61 Arr. Cass. P.09.0304.F, 11 March 2009. This was in line with pre-Salduz Belgian Cour de cassation juris-
prudence: see, for example, Arr. Cass. P991585N, 14 December 1999. See also Se´nat de Belgique,
Commission de la Justice, Rapport ‘Les suites de l’arreˆt Salduz’, Audition de M. Timperman, avocat ge´n-
e´ral pre`s la Cour de cassation, 2 March 2011, at 30. Cf. Arr. Cass. P.10.0914.F, 15 December 2010, where
the Court found a violation of Article 6 ECHR as a result of the suspect making incriminating statements
in the absence of a lawyer.
62 Cour d’assises de Lie`ge, 30 March 2009, JLMB 2009/19 at 898.
63 Supra n 55 at para 31.
64 In Belgium, the Conseil Supe´rieur de la Justice said in a legal opinion in June 2009 that it was ‘convinced of
the restricted and often theoretical character of the rights [that were currently] guaranteed by [Belgian
criminal] procedure’: Conseil Supe´rieur de la Justice, Avis sur la proposition de loi modifiant l’article 1er
de la loi du 20 juillet 1990 relative a` la de´tention pre´ventive. As far as Scotland is concerned, the UK
Supreme Court opined in Cadder that ‘[t]he guarantees otherwise available [were] entirely commend-
able’, but, at the same time, ‘in a very real sense . . . beside the point’: Cadder v HM Advocate, supra n 40
at paras 50 and 66.
65 Cadder v HM Advocate, ibid. at para 4. Leverick reinforces this point, by observing that Scotland had
more specifically failed to take note of the conclusions of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure
in England and Wales on the right to legal assistance. Published shortly after the Scottish provisions ori-
ginally came into effect, the Commission’s report was critical of similar provisions in England and Wales
and opened the way for the introduction there of the right to legal assistance with the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984: Leverick, ‘The Supreme Court Strikes Back’ (2011) 15 Edinburgh Law
Review 287 at 292.
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By contrast, the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure provided for assistance by a
lawyer of the suspect’s choice66 and entitled the suspect to be assisted by a lawyer
when questioned by the investigating judge.67 But Dutch jurisprudence had generally
interpreted these provisions to mean no right to legal assistance prior to, or during,
police interrogation.68 Police interrogation was also preceded by a ‘temporary arrest’
phase, lasting a maximum of six hours, during which the Code of Criminal
Procedure provided for no intervention of a lawyer.69 In an analysis of the response
of the Netherlands to Salduz, Brants exposed Dutch hostility towards legal assistance
as firmly rooted in the inquisitorial understanding of the suspect as ‘primarily a
source of information’ and the prosecution service as the institution ‘in charge of the
police’ that ‘can be trusted to also take the suspect’s pretrial interests into account’.70
If the ‘inquisitorial resistance’ explanation is right (and similar experiences in France
and Belgium offer comparative support to such a finding),71 then it must also pro-
vide a significant explanation for the Netherlands’ historic neglect of the need for
greater protections for the suspect in this field. Brants provides an account of resist-
ance and complacency in the face of miscarriages of justice, while underlining the
dearth of criticism from indigenous academic and professional sources.72 Despite all
this, at the time of Salduz, the Netherlands was, perhaps surprisingly, taking its first
steps towards greater recognition of suspects’ rights at the police station, notably by
putting in place a trial project whereby, exceptionally, suspects could be assisted by a
lawyer in interrogations for unlawful killings.73
The pre-Gormley limitations of the Irish position on ‘reasonable access’ to a law-
yer have already been sketched above. Here it can be added that a ‘reasonableness’
standard also applied to the duration or number of consultations permitted, once a
solicitor’s presence at the police station has been secured, exacerbating the uncer-
tainty surrounding the exercise of the right to legal assistance in practice.74
66 Article 28 Code of Criminal Procedure (the Netherlands). See also Spronken and Attinger, Procedural
Rights in Criminal Proceedings: Existing Level of Safeguards in the European Union, European Commission
Report, Directorate General – Justice, Freedom and Security (2005) at 73.
67 Article 186 Code of Criminal Procedure (the Netherlands).
68 See Brants, supra n 3 at 300; Blackstock et al., Inside Police Custody: An Empirical Account of Suspects’
Rights in Four Jurisdictions (2014) at 109; and Brants, ‘What Limits to Harmonising Justice’ in Colson and
Field, EU Criminal Justice and the Challenges of Legal Diversity (forthcoming 2016). In its 2009
Concluding Observations on the Netherlands, the UN Human Rights Committee noted that in the
Netherlands ‘a person suspected of involvement in a criminal offence has no right to have legal counsel
present during police questioning’, and recommended that ‘full effect [should be given] to the right to
contact counsel in the context of a police interrogation’: Human Rights Committee, Concluding
Observations regarding the Netherlands, 28 July 2009, CCPR/C/NLD/CO/4, at para 11.
69 Prakken and Spronken, ‘The Investigative Stage of the Criminal Process in the Netherlands’ in Cape et al.
(eds), Suspects in Europe: Procedural Rights at the Investigative Stage of the Criminal Process in the European
Union (2007) 155 at 168.
70 Brants, supra n 3 at 299. See also Brants, ‘What Limits to Harmonising Justice’, supra n 68.
71 On France, see Giannoulopoulos, supra n 49 at 324–6. On Belgium, see Fermon, Verbruggen and De
Decker, ‘The Investigative Stage of the Criminal Process in Belgium’ in Cape et al. (eds), supra n 69, 29
at 48.
72 Brants, supra n 3 at 300–1.
73 Ibid. at 301.
74 Report of the Working Group to Advise on a System Providing for the Presence of a Legal
Representative During Garda Interviews, July 2013, available at: www.justice.ie/en/JELR/
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The analysis of Justice Hardiman in the separate concurring judgment in Gormley
brings to the surface similar concerns, such as in relation to the overwhelming condi-
tions of police custody that undermine the suspect’s resolution to see a solicitor or
the proliferation of non-specialist solicitors giving advice on complex areas of crim-
inal law.75 All this must also be seen against the backdrop of the statutory power to
draw adverse inferences from ‘silence’ in custodial interrogations in Ireland, which
further highlights the flaws inherent in the pre-Gormley position there.76 More im-
portantly, like all of the countries mentioned above, Ireland had long deprived sus-
pects of the right to have a lawyer present during questioning.77 Gormley deferred
judgment on this matter, but opened the way for the reform of this crucial aspect of
custodial legal assistance.
D. After Salduz
Salduz caused legal earthquakes in all of the countries examined above, even if some
were less powerful than others. The Scottish government was the first to react.
Following the Supreme Court’s strict application of Salduz in Cadder, it rushed legis-
lation through the Scottish Parliament that recognized suspects’ right to have a pri-
vate consultation with a solicitor before any questioning begins and at any other
time during such questioning, but did not specifically prescribe a right to have a law-
yer present when questioned by the police.78 The police may afford the suspect
access to a lawyer during interrogation, but there is nothing in the relevant Act that
prescribes a duty to do so.79 The legislation was enacted in October 2010,80 leading
to considerable criticism and debate coming especially from Scottish scholarly circles,
protesting an inappropriate interference by the Supreme Court with unique domestic
elements of the Scottish criminal justice system and pinpointing the collateral risk of
a diminution of other rights of the suspect.81 Since then, the Scottish government
has appointed Lord Carloway to undertake a review of key elements of criminal law
Report%20Final%2015%20July.pdf/Files/Report%20Final%2015%20July.pdf [last accessed 24 August
2015].
75 Gormley, supra n 1.
76 Sections 28–32 Criminal Justice Act 1997. See also Sweeney, ‘The Questioning of Criminal Suspects in
Ireland’ (2015) 25 Irish Criminal Law Journal 37 at 42.
77 Lavery v Member in Charge, Carrickmacross Garda Station, supra n 6.
78 Section 15A(3) Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, as inserted by Section 1(4) Criminal
Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010.
79 See Chalmers and Leverick, ‘ “Substantial and Radical Change”: A New Dawn for Scottish Criminal
Procedure?’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 837 at 846.
80 The Bill for this Act was passed by the Scottish Parliament on 27 October 2010 and received Royal
Assent on 29 October 2010.
81 See generally Ferguson, ‘The Right of Access to a Lawyer’ [2009] Scots Law Times 107; Ferguson,
‘Repercussions of the Cadder Case: The ECHR’s Fair Trial Provisions and Scottish Criminal Procedure’
[2011] Criminal Law Review 743; McCluskey, supra n 56 at 276; White and Ferguson, ‘Sins of the
Father? The “Sons of Cadder” ’ [2012] Criminal Law Review 357; and Ferguson and Raitt, ‘A Clear and
Coherent Package of Reforms? The Scottish Government Consultation Paper on the Carloway Report’
[2012] Criminal Law Review 909. See also Ferguson’s and White’s brief rejoinder to Giannoulopoulos,
supra n 3 at 384; and the comment on Cadder in Scottish Criminal Law, which starts with the observation
that ‘[o]ne of the many interesting aspects of this decision is that it overrule[d] the view of a total of 15
Scottish High Court judges and three appeal courts’: ‘Case Comment: Cadder v HM Advocate’ [2010]
Scottish Criminal Law 1265 at 1307.
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and practice,82 and has introduced a Bill into the Scottish Parliament that takes for-
ward and develops Lord Carloway’s recommendations.83 The Bill provides for a
‘right to have a solicitor present while being interviewed’.84
France followed suit only a few months later, with the Law of 14 April 2011,
which, for the first time, afforded suspects the right to be assisted by a lawyer when
questioned by the police.85 Passing this legislation was the final act of a long reform
process that the government had initiated much earlier—half-heartedly, it must be
said—and that only found momentum as a result of French courts’ enthusiastic
reception of Salduz and the cases that followed it. In fact, the French government
had originally settled for solutions that were going much less far than those
embraced by Strasbourg,86 and it is fair to argue that it was only under the burden of
pivotal decisions applying Salduz—first by the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional
Council),87 then the Cour de cassation (the French ‘supreme court’)88—that the gov-
ernment was forced to change direction.89
The Belgian Law of 13 August 201190 mirrors the legislation enacted in France,
providing the suspect with the right to consult confidentially with a lawyer from the
beginning of the interrogation and before the first questioning by the police91 as well
as the right to be assisted by a lawyer during questioning.92 Salduz ‘served as the det-
onator’ for this radical development, observed the Colle`ge des procureurs ge´ne´raux
(the body that represents prosecuting officials in Belgium).93 The Colle`ge sought to
82 The Carloway Review, Report and Recommendations, 17 November 2011, available at: www.scotland.
gov.uk/Resource/Doc/925/0122808.pdf [last accessed 24 August 2015].
83 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill 2013.
84 Section 24(2) Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill 2013.
85 Supra n 52.
86 For example, giving the suspect the opportunity to meet with a lawyer for 30 minutes only after 12 hours
of interrogation, coupled with continuous legal assistance during questioning in cases where the interro-
gation would be extended beyond the initial 24-hour time limit: see Roujou de Boube´e, ‘L’assistance de
l’avocat pendant la garde a` vue’ (2010) Recueil Dalloz 868; and Avant-projet du future Code de proce´dure
pe´nale, version du 1er mars 2010, available at: www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/avant_projet_cpp_20100304.
pdf [last accessed 24 August 2015].
87 Decision No 201014/22 QPC of 30 July 2010, available in English at: www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/
conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/201014_22QPCen201014qpc.pdf [last accessed 24 August
2015].
88 Crim 19 octobre 2010, Bull crim 163; Crim 19 octobre 2010, Bull crim 164; Crim 19 octobre 2010, Bull
crim 165; Crim 4 janvier 2011, n 10-85.520, Recueil Dalloz 2011, 242, obs Le´na; Crim 18 janvier 2011, n
10-83.750, Recueil Dalloz 2011, 381; Crim 16 fe´vrier 2011, n 10-82.865, Recueil Dalloz 2011, 953; Crim
15 avril 2011, 4 arreˆts (n P 10-17.049, F 10-30.313, J 10-30.316 et D 10-30.242), Recueil Dalloz 2011,
1080; Recueil Dalloz 2011, 1128, interview Roujou de Boube´e; Jurisclasseur pe´nal 2011, 17, 483, De´traz.
89 See Giudicelli, ‘Le Conseil constitutionnel et la garde a` vue: “Puisque ces myste`res nous de´passent,
feignons d’en eˆtre l’organisateur” ’ [2011] Revue de science criminelle et de droit pe´nal compare´ 139; and de
Lamy, ‘L’avance´e des garanties en matie`re de garde a` vue ou la conse´cration d’un basculement de la pro-
ce´dure pe´nale vers la phase policie`re’ [2011] Revue de science criminelle et de droit pe´nal compare´ 165. See,
in detail, Giannoulopoulos, supra n 49 at 311–21.
90 Loi du 13 aouˆt 2011 modifiant le Code d’instruction criminelle et la loi du 20 juillet 1990 relative a` la
de´tention pre´ventive afin de confe´rer des droits, dont celui de consulter un avocat et d’eˆtre assiste´e par
lui, a` toute personne auditionne´e et a` toute personne prive´e de liberte´.
91 Article 4 of the Law of 13 August 2011 adding Article 2bis, para 1 to the Law of 20 July 1990.
92 Article 4 of the Law of 13 August 2011 adding Article 2bis, para 2 to the Law of 20 July 1990.
93 Circulaire n 8/2011 du Colle`ge des procureurs ge´ne´raux pre`s les Cours d’appel, 23 November 2011, at
16.
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fill in the gap in the existing legislation by issuing provisional guidance that was going
some way towards providing the suspect with the right to legal assistance.94 The
Association des juges d’instruction (association of investigating judges) and the Conseil
d’E´tat (Council of State) likewise put pressure on the government to rectify the situ-
ation, though they adopted narrow interpretations of Salduz and the solutions deriv-
ing therefrom.95 The effect of Salduz was more immediately reflected in some lower
courts’ responses, as they refused to base convictions on confessions obtained in the
absence of a lawyer from custodial interrogation96 (and this despite the fact that the
Cour de cassation had found Belgian legislation allowing this to be compatible with
Article 6 of the ECHR),97 as well as in the initiatives undertaken by Bar Associations
across the country to provide legal assistance wherever local judicial authorities so
permitted.98 In this climate, legislative reform was inevitable, and though the govern-
ment had originally attempted to avoid giving full effect to the Salduz jurisprudence
(first by proposing that legal assistance should only be provided after eight hours of
interrogation had elapsed,99 then by insisting that, in a first phase of the reform,
there should be no right to the presence of a lawyer during questioning),100 in the
end it ‘conceded’ both rights. The fact that the legislation of August 2011 has come
to be widely known as ‘loi Salduz’ (‘Salduz legislation’)101 speaks for itself about the
influence of the ECtHR in effecting a ‘fundamental’ and ‘revolutionary’ criminal just-
ice reform in Belgium, to borrow the words of the Minister of Justice who intro-
duced the relevant Bill in the Belgian Parliament.102
The Netherlands offers an illustration of a more moderate, though still not final-
ized, response to Salduz. In contrast to Scotland, France and Belgium, the Dutch
government has still today—nearly seven years after Salduz—not enacted legislation
giving effect to the latter. A new Bill, drafted following publication of the European
Union (EU) Directive on the right of access to a lawyer,103 is currently pending
94 Circulaire n 7/2010 du Colle`ge des procureurs ge´ne´raux pre`s les Cours d’Appel, 4 May 2010; and
Circulaire n 15/2010 du Colle`ge des procureurs ge´ne´raux pre`s les Cours d’Appel, 14 July 2010.
95 For example, the Conseil d’E´tat, in a legal opinion issued on 19 April 2011, pointed out the lack of clarity
in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, advising the government to wait for further clarification, while pro-
posals by the Association des juges d’instruction only went as far as to advocate a confidential meeting with
a lawyer prior to, but not during, interrogation by the police, and giving investigating judges the discre-
tion to allow the presence of the lawyer in interrogations undertaken by them: see respectively Conseil
d’E´tat, Rapport annuel 2010–11, Avis 49.413/AG, 19 April 2011, at 52; and Se´nat de Belgique, supra n
61, Expose´ introductif du Ministre de la justice, at 6.
96 Lie`ge, 6e Chambre, 15 septembre 2010 confirming Correctionnelle Lie`ge 14 avril 2010.
97 Supra n 60.
98 Se´nat de Belgique, supra n 61, Expose´ de M Chevalier, pre´sident de l’Ordre des barreaux francophones
et germanophones, at 68–9.
99 See Document parlementaire, Se´nat 2008–09, 4-1079/1.
100 See Document parlementaire, Se´nat 2010–2011, 5-663/1.
101 See, for example, Service de la politique criminelle, E´valuation de la ‘loi Salduz’, available at: www.dsb-
spc.be/web/index.php?option¼com_content&task¼view&id¼152 [last accessed 24 August 2015].
102 Se´nat de Belgique, supra n 61 at 8.
103 Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest
warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to
communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty [2013] OJ L
294/1. Article 3 of the Directive recognises the right of suspects to have access to a lawyer without un-
due delay, and to meet in private and communicate with the lawyer representing them, including prior
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before the Lower House (House of Representatives) for approval, but there is still a
lot of uncertainty as to when the parliamentary process will be concluded.104 The
Dutch Supreme Court’s approval of the pre-Salduz status quo provides an explan-
ation for the Netherlands’ continued reluctance to give effect to the right to legal
assistance. In a much-awaited decision handed down in June 2009, the Court recog-
nized that Salduz implied a right to prior consultation, to be informed of that right
and ‘to be able within reasonable limits to exercise it’, but not a right to be assisted
by a lawyer during interrogation, save for the interrogation of juveniles.105 The
Supreme Court explained that it had to defer to the government the design of spe-
cific rules on legal assistance, and that, ‘in expectation of new legislation, it could
[only] rule on the minimum standard apparently required’.106 The legal vacuum left
by the government’s reluctance to legislate and the Supreme Court’s adoption of a
restrictive interpretation of the Salduz jurisprudence (to the extent that this had
evolved by 2009) was filled, to some degree, by binding instructions issued by the
prosecution service.107 However, these not only did not provide for the presence of
a lawyer during interrogation, but also qualified consultation rights according to the
seriousness of the offence in question and the age of the suspect. Similar qualifica-
tions were made to receiving legal aid, being notified of the right to legal assistance
and having the ability to waive the right.108 A Bill introduced in the Dutch
Parliament in April 2011 was going further than that, providing inter alia for the pres-
ence of a lawyer during interrogation regarding offences punishable by a maximum
of no less than six years imprisonment, but the Bill was abandoned.109 In recent,
more dramatic developments, first the Attorney-General gave legal advice to the
Supreme Court approving the presence of the lawyer during questioning, then the
Supreme Court opined that the right to legal assistance must be regulated by law
and that, if no legislation is forthcoming, it might have to rule differently in future
cases, giving recognition to the right.110 The EU Directive seems to have finally
brought the Netherlands closer to extending the scope of the right to legal assistance
to questioning, and, more importantly for present purposes, the right for their lawyer to be present and
participate effectively when they are questioned by the police. The Directive goes as far as give suspects
the right for their lawyer to attend particular investigative or evidence-gathering acts such as identity par-
ades, confrontations and reconstructions of the scenes of the crime.
104 It is now believed that the Netherlands might wait until the transposition deadline of November 2016
before enacting the Bill into law. I am thankful to Chrisje Brants and Kelly Pitcher, experts in Dutch
criminal procedure, for discussion on this point. See also Brants, ‘What Limits to Harmonising Justice’,
supra n 68. On the Directive 2013/48/EU, see generally Van Puyenbroeck and Vermeulen, ‘Towards
Minimum Procedural Guarantees for the Defence in Criminal Proceedings in the EU’ (2011) 60
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1017.
105 HR 30 June 2009, NJ 2009, 349. See Verhoeven and Stevens, ‘The Lawyer in the Dutch Interrogation
Room: Influence on Police and Suspect’ (2012) 9 Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender
Profiling 69 at 70.
106 Brants, supra n 3 at 302.
107 See Blackstock, supra n 68 at 109.
108 See Brants, supra n 3 at 303.
109 Groenhuijsen and Kooijmans, The Reform of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure in Comparative
Perspective (2012) at 77.
110 See Leeuw, ‘Access to a Lawyer in the Netherlands: Does Judicial Restraint Lead to ECHR Non-
Compliance?’, 26 June 2014, available at: www.fairtrials.org/press/guest-post-access-to-a-lawyer-in-the-
netherlands-does-judicial-restraint-lead-to-echr-non-compliance/ [last accessed 24 August 2015].
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to include the presence of the lawyer during questioning, though it must be stressed
that the Bill that will give it effect comes with many strings attached, subjecting the
exercise of the right to various exceptions.111
Finally, in Ireland, as already discussed, Salduz and other international jurispru-
dence eventually drove the Supreme Court to strike the vague ‘reasonable access’
test into oblivion and prohibit any questioning prior to the arrival of the lawyer.
Even more dramatic was the shift to allowing suspects to have a lawyer present dur-
ing questioning. Since the issue had not arisen on the facts of Gormley, the Supreme
Court refrained from deciding it, intimating, however, that the solicitor’s presence
was integral to the right to legal assistance.112 Then, only two months after Gormley,
the Director of Public Prosecutions issued a directive to the Garda Siochana—and
the Department of Justice informed the Law Society accordingly— to the effect that
if suspects ask for the assistance of a lawyer during questioning the gardaı´ should
accede to their request. The most significant change of Irish criminal procedure in
the past 30 years had Salduz and ECtHR jurisprudence written all over it.113
3. VARIATIONS IN NATIONAL RESPONSES
These modern transformations of custodial legal assistance in Europe provide ample
demonstration of the ECtHR’s drastic influence on national legal systems,114 and
confirm academic analyses of Strasbourg’s power to effect reform in areas where the
balance of local powers—political, professional or institutional—may have long
deprived the national legal system of the capacity to venture forward in imaginative,
bold ways.115 All five countries analysed above have, under Strasbourg’s undeniable
111 Brants, ‘What Limits to Harmonising Justice’, supra n 68.
112 The Court again relied on ECtHR jurisprudence, in addition to other international jurisprudence, to
state that ‘the entitlements of a suspect extend to having the relevant lawyer present’: Gormley, supra n 1
at para 9.10.
113 See Daly and Jackson, ‘The Criminal Justice Process: From Questioning to Trial’ in Healy et al. (eds),
Routledge Handbook of Irish Criminology (forthcoming 2016); and Robinson, ‘Key Changes to Criminal
Law Get the Silent Treatment’, Irish Times, 19 May 2014. Mark Kelly, the Director of the Irish Council
of Civil Liberties (ICCL), noted in an ICCL press release on the day Gormley was delivered that it was
‘highly significant that the Supreme Court ha[d] also drawn attention to European Court of Human
Rights case law that “irretrievable harm” to the fairness of a trial can result if a person does not have a
lawyer present during police questioning’ and that ‘[t]he Government should heed the Supreme Court’s
clear call for law reform in this area, by changing the law to require that a lawyer be present when people
in custody are questioned by members of An Garda Sı´ochana’: ICCL, Press Release, ‘Supreme Court
Sends Government Clear Message on Fair Trial Reforms’, 6 March 2014, available at: www.iccl.ie/news/
2014/03/06/supreme-court-sends-government-clear-message-on-fair-trial-reforms.html [last accessed 24
August 2015]. It must also be noted that the Department of Justice and Equality was considering the possi-
bility of introducing a scheme providing for the presence of a lawyer during interviews since at least
January 2013. When ‘prompted by emerging international jurisprudence’—ECtHR jurisprudence and the
EU Directive on the right of access to a lawyer—it established a Working Group to advise on this issue.
The Group concluded that revisions could be made to the existing Garda Station Legal Advice Scheme to
allow Ireland to align itself with ECtHR jurisprudence, even in case the Government decided not to opt
into the Directive: see Report of the Working Group, supra n 74 at 22.
114 See also Hodgson, ‘Safeguarding Suspects’ Rights in Europe: A Comparative Perspective’ (2011) 14
New Criminal Law Review 611 at 662.
115 See generally Delmas-Marty, Lec¸on inaugurale au Colle`ge de France, E´tudes juridiques comparatives et
internationalisation du droit (2003) at 22. See also Bingham, Widening Horizons: The Influence of
Comparative Law and International Law on Domestic Law (2010) at 73–4; Helfer, ‘Redesigning the
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influence, come out of a protracted period of isolationism in the field of suspects’
rights to introduce—or, at least, take important steps towards—reform long seen as
providing no fit with the national legal culture. This is a good point of departure
when assessing the ECtHR’s role in the construction of a new landscape of proced-
ural rights in Europe. But important variations in the national responses can also be
located, and these lend themselves to a deeper analysis of the diverse ways in which
the Convention’s influence may manifest itself in different European countries.
A first point worthy of consideration relates to the urgency with which the five
legal systems discussed above have responded to Salduz. Scotland, France and
Belgium have all shown reasonably quick reflexes to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence,
introducing legislation with a difference of only a few months between them. An
immediate legislative response was seen in all of them as the direct and inevitable
outcome of the Court’s jurisprudence. The Scottish government resorted to ‘emer-
gency’ legislation,116 despite the profound impact that this was likely to have on
thousands of cases that were ongoing, awaiting trial or held in the system pending
the hearing of an appeal.117 The Belgian Minister of Justice spoke with similar ur-
gency and conviction in the Belgian Parliament, accepting that ‘the Salduz jurispru-
dence [was] a given and imposed on [Belgium]’.118 Salduz was perceived in exactly
the same way in parliamentary discussions in France, all the more so after the
ECtHR found a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR in Brusco v France.119 The impact
of the reform in both Belgium and France was anticipated with the same level of con-
cern that existed in Scotland, particularly due to the number of cases that would be
put in peril and the complications arising from having to set up an effective system
of legal assistance within very strict deadlines.120 The Netherlands, on the other
hand, has still not legislated the right to have a lawyer present during custodial inter-
rogation, though, paradoxically, it was the only one of the above legal systems which
had experimented with application of this right prior to Salduz. The fact that a Bill is
only now being examined in the Dutch House of Representatives means that the
European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European
Human Rights Regime’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 125; Rozakis, ‘The Particular
Role of the Strasbourg Case-Law in the Development of Human Rights in Europe’ (2009) 57 Nomiko
Bima 20; Roberts and Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, 2nd edn (2010) at 704. Waters specifically locates
the transformative power of the ECHR in its enabling domestic courts to defer less to the executive
branch and majority views: Waters, ‘Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law’ (2005) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 487 at 520.
116 See Scottish Parliament, Official Report col 29574, 27 October 2010, cited by Stark, ‘The Consequences
of Cadder’ (2011) 15 Edinburgh Law Review 293 at 294.
117 As acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Cadder v HM Advocate, supra n 40 at para 4.
118 Se´nat de Belgique, supra n 61 at 4. This message was echoed by many legal experts participating in the
works of the parliamentary committee examining the consequences of Salduz. See indicatively Se´nat de
Belgique, ibid. at 31, 41 and 56.
119 Supra n 22. See also Commission des lois constitutionnelles, Compte rendu n 25, Session ordinaire de
2010–11, 9 December 2010.
120 In relation to France, see generally Alix, ‘Les droits de la de´fense au cours de l’enqueˆte de police apre`s la
re´forme de la garde a` vue: E´tat des lieux et perspectives’ (2011) Recueil Dalloz 1699; and Pradel,
‘Proce´dure pe´nale: Septembre 2010 – aouˆt 2011’ (2011) Recueil Dalloz 2231. On Belgium, see Beys and
Smeets, ‘L’avocat chez les “flics”: Le loup dans la bergerie ou l’agneau dans la guelle du loup?’ in
Guillain and Wustefeld (eds), Le roˆle de l’avocat dans la phase pre´liminaire du proce`s pe´nal, Collection du
Jeune Barreau de Charleroi (2012) at 89.
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country’s delayed response to Salduz was second only to that of Ireland. Before
Gormley, the effect of Salduz had been virtually invisible there, while the government
has still today not introduced a Bill dealing with these matters. These temporal vari-
ations may, of course, be due to coincidence—for example, an appropriate case
reaching the national ‘supreme court’—but they may also reveal the different under-
standings that may exist in different legal systems as to giving the Convention imme-
diate effect in practice.
Asking ‘to what extent’—and not just ‘when’—the national legal system gives
effect to Convention jurisprudence can offer a far more revealing illustration of the
diverse ways in which the latter exercises its influence in national legal systems. The
preceding analyses on the right to have a lawyer present during questioning provide
evidence of such divergence. Even where suspects are given access to a lawyer during
questioning, important variations exist as to the lawyers’ role there. Thus, while
French and Belgian legislation, and now the Bill pending before the Dutch House of
Representatives, rigorously restrict lawyers to a passive, non-adversarial role during
questioning (specifically enumerating actions that can be undertaken by them while
prohibiting others),121 in Scotland it was felt that the role of the lawyer in providing
advice did not need to be set in legislation.122 In theory, this allows for the adoption
of a more adversarial attitude during interrogation, but, possibly, also gives the police
carte blanche to restrict the lawyers’ ability to actively represent their clients in inter-
view. Scotland also differs from France, Belgium and the Netherlands in that it does
not regulate the duration and frequency of private consultations with a lawyer
(consultation lasts a maximum of 30 minutes in the three Continental systems).123
On the other hand, consultations in Scotland seem to invariably take place via tele-
phone, as documented by an important recent empirical study.124
121 The French Law of 14 April 2011 forbids the lawyer from asking any questions before the police have
finished interviewing the suspect and gives the police the right to block the lawyer from asking any ques-
tions even at the end of the interview, if the questions are seen as potentially damaging for the investiga-
tion. The police are also entitled to put an immediate end to the interview, at any time, for the
ambiguous reason of facing a difficulty: see Article 63-4-3 Code de proce´dure pe´nale, as inserted by
Article 8 of Law of 14 April 2011. The prosecution service circular bringing precision to the Belgian
legislation of August 2011 specifically prohibits the lawyer from making a defence speech (plaidoirie),
entering into discussions with the police, speaking to his client or whispering something into his ear:
Circulaire n 8/2011 du Colle`ge des procureurs ge´ne´raux, supra n 93 at 59. The Dutch Bill giving effect
to Salduz and the EU Directive likewise provides for many exceptions such as ‘temporary derogation’ of
the ability to exercise the right to legal assistance, limiting the lawyer to particular interventions and
allowing him to ask ‘questions only at the beginning and the end of the police interview’: see Brants,
‘What Limits to Harmonising Justice’, supra n 68.
122 The Carloway Review, supra n 82.
123 Regarding France, see Article 63-4 Code de proce´dure pe´nale, as inserted by Article 7 of Law of 14
April 2011. Regarding Belgium, see Article 4 of Law of 13 August 2011 adding Article 2bis, para 1 to
Law of 20 July 1990. Regarding the Netherlands, see the prosecution service binding instructions, cited
by Brants, supra n 3 at 303. In Belgium, in addition to the 30-minute consultation prior to questioning,
the suspect also has the right to request once that the questioning be interrupted in order to consult pri-
vately with his lawyer for a maximum duration of 15 minutes: see Article 4 of Law of 13 August 2011
adding Article 2bis, para 2 to Law of 20 July 1990.
124 See Blackstock, supra n 68 at 127. See also Nicholson, ‘Rights under Question’ [2010] Journal of the
Law Society of Scotland, available at: www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/55-11/1008872.aspx [last
accessed 24 August 2014].
118  Strasbourg Jurisprudence and the Right to Custodial Legal Assistance
 at B
runel U
niversity on July 8, 2016
http://hrlr.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Moreover, in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, the police are obliged to delay
the questioning of the suspect only for a period of two hours from the moment contact
has been made with the lawyer.125 The Bill currently examined by the Dutch House
of Representatives goes as far as to give the police the power to question the suspect
immediately after arrest in the absence of counsel or to decide not to admit the law-
yer into the interrogation room in exigent circumstances.126 In Scotland, there is no
fixed rule on how long the police must wait before they can question the suspect,
but the Carloway Review considered that ‘one hour’ in urban areas and ‘two hours’
in rural areas would be acceptable.127 In Ireland, on the other hand, Gormley’s effect
is that there can be no questioning until the solicitor arrives at the police station. No
time limit applies there.128
To take another example of variations in national responses, in France, despite
the significant advances achieved with the April 2011 legislation, the lawyer can still
be excluded from interrogation for 48 hours in relation to organized crime offences,
and a whole 72 hours in investigations relating to terrorism and drug trafficking.129
Similar exceptions are not encountered in the other countries examined in this art-
icle. Of even more concern is the fast-growing practice of affording no legal assist-
ance to suspects voluntarily attending the police station. This is now the position in
France in relation to both voluntary attenders and persons who are not yet suspected
of the commission of an offence, and this with the blessing of the Conseil constitution-
nel.130 In Belgium, depriving suspects not detained by the police of legal assistance—
or of mere consultation rights, in less serious offences131—was seen as a compromise
needed for the right to legal assistance to be indeed recognized in cases where the
suspect is detained by the police. Allegedly this was needed to avoid organizational
and budgetary complications that would otherwise arise.132 Even more curious is the
125 Regarding France, see Article 63-4-2 Code de proce´dure pe´nale, as inserted by Article 8 of Law of 14
April 2011. Regarding Belgium, see Article 4 of Law of 13 August 2011 adding Article 2bis, para 1 to
Law of 20 July 1990. Regarding the Netherlands, see the prosecution service binding instructions, cited
by Brants, supra n 3 at 303.
126 See Articles 28e(1)–28e(4) Kamerstukken II, 2014–2015, 34157, nr. 2 (herdruk). The explanatory
memorandum emphasizes that the application of Article 28e is meant to be exceptional: Kamerstukken
II, 2014–2015, 34157, nr. 3 (tweede herdruk) at 37. I am grateful to Kelly Pitcher for her translations of
relevant parts of the Bill and the memorandum.
127 The Carloway Review, supra n 82 at paras 6.1.29–6.1.32.
128 In Scotland, Gormley could be seen as providing support for the solution adopted by the Criminal
Justice (Scotland) Bill 2013, which mandates that ‘a constable must not begin to interview the [suspect]
until the [suspect’s] solicitor is present’. This makes redundant any reference to a period after which the
police can initiate questioning without a solicitor being present, save for ‘exceptional circumstances’. See
sections 24(3)(a) and 24(4) Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill 2013.
129 Article 706-88 Code de proce´dure pe´nale.
130 Decision No 2011-191/194/195/196/197-QPC of 18 November 2011, at para 20. See generally
Matsopoulou, ‘Les dispositions de la loi du 14 avril 2011 sur la garde a` vue de´clare´es conformes a` la
Constitution’ (2011) Recueil Dalloz 3034; and Bachelet, ‘Admission, sous re´serve, de l’audition libre
dans l’enqueˆte pre´liminaire’, 11 July 2012, available at: revdh.org/2012/07/11/admission-sous-reserve-
de-laudition-libre-dans-lenquete-preliminaire/ [last accessed 24 August 2015].
131 All offences punished with a maximum sentence of less than one year imprisonment and all road traffic
offences, including involuntary manslaughter resulting from a traffic accident, even though this is punish-
able by a maximum of five years imprisonment: see Circulaire n 8/2011 du Colle`ge des procureurs ge´n-
e´raux, supra n 93 at 14.
132 See Circulaire n 8/2011 du Colle`ge des procureurs ge´ne´raux, ibid. at 33.
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fact that, in the Netherlands, voluntary attenders are actually presumed to have con-
sulted a lawyer before attending the police station and are therefore afforded no fur-
ther right to consultation.133 Scotland, on the other hand, provides voluntary
attenders with the same right to have access to a solicitor as those who are detained
at the police station.134 Such divergence cannot be taken lightly, as possible police
over-reliance on ‘voluntary attendance’ could undermine the effect of Salduz rights
reserved for later stages of the process.135 It must be noted here that, though Salduz
itself may have not directly addressed the issue of voluntary attenders’ right to legal
assistance, post-Salduz jurisprudence has accepted that the right may be activated
even before arrest or the first interrogation, even outside the police station,136 and
even where the police may have examined the suspect as a witness.137 The rule
devised by Strasbourg may not be as clear in relation to consultation rights or the
right to have a lawyer present during interrogation (a proper case has not reached
the Court yet), still one might have reasonably expected to find fewer variations
here; the Court takes as its main premise that a person interrogated at the investiga-
tion stage finds himself in a vulnerable position, and that, in most cases, only the
assistance of a lawyer can properly compensate for it.138 This is all the more so where
the person concerned is questioned at the police station, and there is much to say
about ‘voluntarily’ attending the police station and having the ‘freedom’ to leave, in
the context of such questioning.139
The above shows that despite the unquestionable influence of the Salduz stream
of cases on national jurisdictions, Salduz rights have been given effect to different de-
grees there. For the most part, this reflects national resistance to fully adopting these
rights, and this despite Strasbourg pronouncing itself with sufficient clarity in this
area. This becomes even more obvious when one looks at post-Salduz organization
of legal assistance in practice, such as in relation to the provision—and remuneration
levels—of legal aid, the efficient functioning of duty lawyer schemes, the operation
of police station training schemes for lawyers and police officers alike or the physical
organization of police consultations in a manner that would guarantee their confiden-
tiality.140 These variations make Salduz an interesting case study of the acceptance of
Strasbourg jurisprudence in national jurisdictions.
133 HR 20 December 2011, LJN BU3504, cited by Blackstock, supra n 68 at 110.
134 Section 15A Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, as inserted by Section 1(4) Criminal Procedure
(Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010.
135 The French practice of voluntary attendance is rightly seen as an effort to introduce through the back
door the old regime of custodial interrogation without legal assistance (garde a` vue ‘a` l’ancienne’): see
generally Boudot and Grazzini, ‘La re´forme de la garde a` vue a` l’e´preuve de la pratique’(2012) Actualite´
Juridique Pe´nal 512 at 515.
136 Aleksandr Zaichenko v Russia Application No 39660/02, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 18 February 2010.
137 Brusco v France, supra n 22.
138 Salduz, supra n 2 at para 54.
139 Pishchalnikov’s description of what is going on at the police station is timely here. The Court pointed
out how the suspect may be ‘surrounded by the police and prosecution authorities, experts in the field
of criminal proceedings, who are well-equipped with various, often psychologically coercive, interroga-
tion techniques which facilitate, or even prompt, receipt of information from an accused’: Pishchalnikov
v Russia, supra n 18 at para 86.
140 An important empirical study of suspects’ rights in England and Wales, France, the Netherlands and
Scotland, conducted in the period 2011–13, has brought to light important shortcomings as to the
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4. SALDUZ AS A PARADIGM OF ACCEPTANCE OF STRASBOURG
JURISPRUDENCE IN CONTRACTING PARTIES?
In a recent Criminal Law Review article, Jackson and Summers used Salduz as a para-
digm drawing support for the thesis that ‘when the ECtHR articulates clear rules and
a coherent rationale for its approach, it can win acceptance for its position even
when this may have far-reaching consequences for national law’.141 The article con-
trasted Strasbourg’s success in gaining acceptance for its position on custodial legal
assistance in the United Kingdom and Switzerland (the two comparative points of
reference in the article)—as a direct result of Salduz setting clear rules and having a
coherent rationale—with Strasbourg’s failure to advance its thesis on confrontation
(in the same legal systems), precisely because the relevant jurisprudence lacked a
coherent rationale and was not providing national courts with clear rules.142 Though
not applicable to confrontation evidence, the analysis in the preceding sections offers
a useful opportunity to scrutinize the Salduz part of Jackson’s and Summers’ argu-
ment. At an empirical level, developments in the five systems examined here conform
with Jackson’s and Summers’ observations about the effect of Salduz. In these
European systems, Strasbourg has in principle gained acceptance for its position on
custodial legal assistance. There is also evidence that where this was not immediately
so, it was specifically grey areas of Salduz that may have fuelled resistance or given
rise to a more reluctant approach.143 But here it is as well to draw attention to the
variations in the national responses sketched above. These considerably influence
the application of Salduz rights in practice, to a degree that variations cannot be dis-
missed as routine or insignificant. Seen from this angle, the argument that clarity
gains acceptability may need to be qualified. Variations in national responses signify
effective implementation of Salduz rights in practice: see Blackstock et al., supra n 68 at 435–9, 448–50
and 454–6. Beys and Smeets report that in some police stations in Belgium consultations are taking
place behind a glass partition, that police officers can visually observe the interactions between suspects
and lawyers and that many lawyers refuse to participate in legal aid schemes due to serious complica-
tions with remuneration: see Beys and Smeets, supra n 120 at 108 and 117. Similar problems have been
encountered in France: see Seelow, ‘Rien n’est preˆt pour la “nouvelle” garde a` vue’, Le Monde, 15 April
2011.
141 Jackson and Summers, ‘Confrontation with Strasbourg: UK and Swiss Approaches to Criminal
Evidence’ (2013) Criminal Law Review 114 at 115.
142 With regard to the reception of ECtHR jurisprudence in England and Wales, the argument can be seen
in combination with Dennis’ observation that English courts have not accepted Strasbourg’s jurispru-
dence on evidential matters uncritically, where they have found it ‘wanting in terms of clarity, consist-
ency or coherence’: Dennis, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Law of Criminal Evidence: Ten Years On’
(2011) 33 Sydney Law Review 333 at 337.
143 In Belgium, for example, Salduz’s interchanging references to ‘the assistance of a lawyer’ and ‘access to a
lawyer’ (Salduz, supra n 2 at paras 54–55) gave rise to contrasting interpretations as to its precise effect:
a ‘minimalist’ interpretation, according to which access to a lawyer did not go any further than a right to
consultation prior to questioning, and a ‘maximalist’ interpretation, which also encompassed the physical
presence of the lawyer during questioning. The controversy at the national level was resolved when the
ECtHR specified in Brusco v France (supra n 22) that the suspect has the right to be assisted by a lawyer
during questioning, which provides a good illustration of the strength of the argument developed by
Jackson and Summers. See Beernaert, ‘La jurisprudence europe´enne Salduz et ses re´percussions en droit
belge’ in Guillain and Wustefeld, supra n 120, 45 at 45–6. Lack of clarity in Salduz also ‘helped’ the
Supreme Court in the Netherlands and the ‘Working Group’ in Ireland to read the relevant jurispru-
dence as not necessarily providing a right to have a lawyer present during questioning: see HR 30 June
2009, supra n 105; and Report of the Working Group, supra n 74 at 2.
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variable degrees of acceptance. Despite its clear rationale, Salduz was not adopted
with the same urgency or enthusiasm across different European countries, and there
remain important differences as to the extent to which the right to have a lawyer pre-
sent during questioning in particular has been written into national legislation.
Divergent attitudes also come to the fore when one distinguishes between the
responses of national courts and those ultimately provided by national legislation. As
previously discussed, the Belgian Cour de cassation originally considered that national
legislation, which was not even recognizing a right to consultation, was
Salduz-compliant,144 the Dutch Supreme Court has still today not given full effect to
Salduz,145 while the Conseil constitutionnel substantially delayed making the Salduz
rights applicable in France.146 Similarly, before Cadder, the High Court of Justiciary
in Scotland held, post-Salduz, that Scottish law was not in breach of the
Convention.147 Finally, shortly before Gormley, the High Court of Ireland confirmed
the Supreme Court precedent that there was no right to have a lawyer present during
questioning, and this despite first considering ECtHR jurisprudence on the matter.148
In other words, irrespective of its alleged clear rules and rationale, Salduz failed, on
these occasions, to gain judicial acceptance in the way eventually achieved through
legislation or subsequent judicial extrapolations on the matter. The variable adoption
of Salduz in these European countries does not necessarily agree with the observa-
tion that clear rules and a coherent rationale will gain ECtHR jurisprudence accept-
ance in contracting parties.
The above observations take nothing away from the specific comparative analysis
undertaken by Jackson and Summers, which has shown important commonalities in
the responses of the UK and Switzerland to ECtHR jurisprudence in conforming to
Salduz and resisting Strasbourg’s rulings on confrontation. But they do highlight the
need, and opportunity, to situate such analysis in a wider context of the diverse fac-
tors that determine national responses to Strasbourg jurisprudence. Jackson and
Summers allude to this need by noting how the desire to defend legal tradition has
been the main source of resistance to Strasbourg’s approach on confrontation.149
The argument that when Strasbourg articulates clear rules and a coherent rationale
for its approach, it can enhance adherence to Convention jurisprudence, is surely
convincing. For one thing, it appeals to intuition, for another, it finds support in
much of the comparative analysis undertaken here. But, by the same token, it is diffi-
cult to see how such a Court-centred explanation of acceptance of ECtHR jurispru-
dence could possibly stand alone, in isolation from contracting party-centred
explanations of acceptance of (or resistance to) such jurisprudence. By Court-centred
explanations I mean those that may offer an account of acceptance mainly by
144 Supra n 60.
145 Supra n 108.
146 The Conseil constitutionnel did not immediately repeal the custodial interrogation provisions it found un-
constitutional, giving the Parliament an 11-month deadline to remedy the situation: see supra n 87 at
para 30.
147 HM Advocate v McLean, supra n 55.
148 JM v Member in Charge of Coolock Garda Station, supra n 6 at para 27. The High Court considered
Salduz and Panovits, but failed to examine Brusco.
149 Jackson and Summers, supra n 141 at 115.
122  Strasbourg Jurisprudence and the Right to Custodial Legal Assistance
 at B
runel U
niversity on July 8, 2016
http://hrlr.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
reference to the actions of the Court, such as in its bringing precision and coherence
to its jurisprudence or in its pursuing a more active dialogue with national supreme
courts and national judges. Contracting party-centred explanations may focus, on the
other hand, on indigenous forces shaping national responses to the Court’s jurispru-
dence. These contracting party-centred explanations may, for instance, locate accept-
ance primarily in the national jurisdiction’s cosmopolitan attitudes or, conversely,
link resistance with the perceived need to defend the national legal tradition against
external influences.150 They may reveal a pragmatic approach to the relationship
with Strasbourg151 or bring to the surface simple logistical considerations relating to
the ability of the contracting party to accommodate the European jurisprudence in
practice.152 Seen from this angle, Jackson’s and Summers’ analysis can help the
Court be more vigilant in elaborating precise rules and a coherent rationale for its
approach—and perhaps even incorporating a reflection on the type of practical
measures needed to ensure their effective implementation in practice—precisely
when it hands down innovative judgments on controversial areas of criminal justice,
where a common European position may have not yet fully crystallized and where
national resistance may thus be likely to slow down, if not seriously obstruct, accept-
ance of the Court’s positions.153 Of course, while such an approach will be welcome
150 For example, Bjorge interpreted Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14 as a manifestation of the Supreme Court’s
‘exceptionalist’ approach to ECtHR jurisprudence, which he contrasted with the ‘internationalist’
approach adopted by the same Court in Cadder: see Bjorge, ‘Exceptionalism and Internationalism in the
Supreme Court: Horncastle and Cadder’ [2011] Public Law 475. Lord Hope explained the different out-
comes in Cadder and McLean as a result of the ‘difference of approach between the two courts to the
Convention’ and ‘its effect on the domestic system’: Lord Hope of Craighead, ‘Scots Law Seen from
South of the Border’ (2012) 16 Edinburgh Law Review 58 at 73. In an analysis of the Belgian response to
Salduz, Beernaert located in the country’s attachment to the inquisitorial legal tradition its reluctance to
legislate a fully ECHR-compliant right to legal assistance, despite wide recognition of the ‘mandatory’
effect of Salduz: Beernaert, supra n 143 at 66–7.
151 In Cadder, the Supreme Court made much of the fact that Salduz was ‘a unanimous decision of the
Grand Chamber’, which was ‘a formidable reason for thinking that [it] should follow it’: Cadder v HM
Advocate, supra n 40 at para 46. Writing extrajudicially, Lord Hope specified that, in contrast to an
appropriate case like Horncastle, where the Supreme Court would ask the Strasbourg Court ‘to “think
again” on a particular point’, Cadder was a case where ‘no amount of dialogue with Strasbourg would re-
sult in a change of view on its part’. Interestingly, such pragmatism by the Supreme Court was largely
the result of Strasbourg having based Salduz on a principle ‘strongly embedded in the European jurispru-
dence’ (the privilege against self-incrimination), which left ‘no room for a decision based on expediency’.
Lord Hope’s analysis provides much support to the thesis developed by Jackson and Summers: see Lord
Hope of Craighead, ibid. at 74.
152 In Belgium, it was argued that affording the right to legal assistance to all suspects, even when they were
not detained by the police, would not be possible for logistical reasons, and that the reform should be
implemented at different stages, prioritizing the more serious cases where the suspect was detained by
the police first: see Circulaire n 8/2011 du Colle`ge des procureurs ge´ne´raux, supra n 93 at 17. The
Conseil constitutionnel referred to the need to put in place a system that ‘could in practice be organised in
a satisfactory way’, which militated against expanding the scope of the right to legal assistance to include
less serious offences: Conseil constitutionnel, Decision No 7/2013 of 14 February 2013, at para B.23.3.
153 As Judge Kovler explains, it is precisely when the ECtHR ‘adopts a novel approach without the basis of
an existing consensus’ that the question of its acceptability in national and international courts becomes
‘of particular importance’: Kovler, ‘The Role of Consensus in the System of the European Convention
on Human Rights’ in ECtHR, Dialogue Between Judges (2008) 11 at 19, available at: www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Dialogue_2008_ENG.pdf [last accessed 24 August 2015]. Conversely, an ‘emerging
European consensus’ or ‘common understanding’ can be a convincing justification for judicial creativity
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by those wishing to see higher levels of harmonization of European criminal proced-
ures, it will no doubt cause further alarm to those who already perceive the Court’s
recent jurisprudence in this area as an indication of its willingness to ‘aggrandise’ its
jurisdiction and impose uniform rules across contracting parties.154
Pausing for a moment of reflection on the above, it must be stressed that recep-
tion of Strasbourg jurisprudence relating to Article 6 of the ECHR must also now be
seen in conjunction with developments at the EU legislation level, notably in relation
to efforts undertaken towards establishing common procedural standards for the
rights of the defence in EU Member States. The recent adoption of the Directive on
the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings155—a development that was
substantially accelerated by Salduz and that aims to solidify the effect of the latter in
national law156—speaks volumes about the emerging synergies between ECtHR jur-
isprudence and EU legislation.157 One can only speculate here, but the EU’s embry-
onic engagement with procedural rights might lead the ECtHR to be more
prescriptive in laying down procedural rules in the future. The Court might see the
fast-developing interaction with the EU as an opportunity to accelerate reception of
its judgments in the EU members of the Council of Europe; the clearer and more
coherent the rules that its jurisprudence articulates, the more effectively they could
inform national implementation of relevant directives. Conversely, there is significant
scope for these directives to influence further development of Strasbourg jurispru-
dence in this area.158 The EU’s new emphasis on procedural rights might also create
a well-meaning competition with Strasbourg for the ‘most effective system’ for the
protection of procedural rights. The Court might look at the example of the
Netherlands, where a perceived lack of clarity in the Salduz jurisprudence has permit-
ted the country to sit on the fence until the Directive on the right of access to a law-
yer finally left no room to manoeuvre away from legislating the right to have a
by the ECtHR, as submitted by Ashworth: see Ashworth, ‘A Decade of Human Rights in Criminal
Justice’ [2014] Criminal Law Review 325 at 335.
154 See generally Hoffmann, ‘The Universality of Human Rights’, Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture, 19
March 2009, available at: www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/internationaljustice/biij/BIIJ2013/hoffmann.
pdf [last accessed 24 August 2015].
155 Directive 2013/48/EU, supra n 103.
156 See Hodgson, supra n 114 at 656.
157 The perplexing negotiations that preceded the adoption of the new Directive on the right of access to a
lawyer provide good indication of the challenges inherent in this process, but also of the opportunities
for the harmonization of fair trial standards across the EU. For a detailed discussion of the background
of, and reactions to, the adoption of the EU Directive, see Anagnostopoulos, ‘The Right of Access to a
Lawyer in Europe: A Long Road Ahead?’ (2014) 4 European Criminal Law Review 3. For the interactions
between Salduz and the Directive, see Jackson, ‘Cultural Barriers on the Road to Providing Suspects
with Access to Lawyers’ in Colson and Field (eds), EU Criminal Justice and the Challenges of Legal
Diversity (forthcoming 2016).
158 This process has already started. In A.T. v Luxembourg Application No 30460/13, Merits and Just
Satisfaction, 9 April 2015, at para 87, the ECtHR drew, for the first time, on the Directive on the right
of access to a lawyer, when reaching the important conclusion that the lawyer’s presence during ques-
tioning will not suffice for the right to fair trial to be respected, and that national legislation must also
provide for private consultation with a lawyer prior to the beginning of the interrogation. In Zachar and
Cˇierny v Slovakia Applications Nos 29376/12 and 29384/12, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 21 July 2015,
the Court relied on the Directive on the right of access to a lawyer and the Directive 2012/13/EU on
the right to information in criminal proceedings [2012] OJ L 142/1, when finding that a waiver of the
right to custodial legal assistance had not been effective.
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lawyer present during questioning. A ECtHR in potential ‘competition’ with the
Court of Justice of the EU might be influenced by relevant directives to become
much more prescriptive when handing down judgments in this area in the future in
order to reduce the variability of national interpretations and increase the level of ad-
herence to its jurisprudence. Jackson’s and Summers’ inquiries as to how the Court
can gain acceptance for its positions become even more timely when examined
against the backdrop of these developments.
At this point, we can broaden the angle of vision even further, beyond the EU
Directive, to also give consideration to the relationship between ECtHR jurispru-
dence and comparative law. We need to go back to Gormley for that purpose.
5. COMMON LAW COMPARATIVISM AND STRASBOURG
JURISPRUDENCE
Even more noteworthy than the wide reading of the right to legal assistance in
Gormley is the Supreme Court’s strong demonstration of legal cosmopolitanism in
this case. In considering the proper approach to the Irish Constitution, the Court
reviewed not just the case law of the ECtHR, but ‘also the constitutional jurispru-
dence of the superior courts of other jurisdictions which have a similar constitutional
regime to [Ireland]’,159 more specifically that of the ‘supreme courts’ of the United
States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This makes Gormley an exceptional case
study of the effect of common law comparativism on the constitutional interpret-
ation of the right to legal assistance, and offers a demonstration of the usefulness of
this comparative methodological tool in getting legal experts ‘to grips with the dy-
namic, multi-level, cosmopolitan legal environments which constitute today’s real-
ity’.160 In Gormley, the Irish Supreme Court first established the ECHR baseline
requirements for the respect of the right to legal assistance, notably access to a lawyer
before and during questioning.161 But to determine the more specific issues raised by
Gormley’s appeal—in particular whether, granted the right to early access to a law-
yer, the police also had to postpone questioning to enable the lawyer to arrive at the
police station—the Court extended its analysis beyond a simple examination of rele-
vant Strasbourg jurisprudence. Particular attention was thus paid to the US Supreme
Court’s historic decision in Miranda v Arizona, which held, among other things, that
‘the interrogation must cease immediately if it has already commenced and can not
[sic] resume until the suspect has had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer’.162
Emphasis was also placed on the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in R v Sinclair,
which read into the constitutional right to retain and instruct counsel without
delay163 ‘a duty on the police to hold off questioning until the detainee has had a rea-
sonable opportunity to consult counsel’,164 as well as on the existence in New
159 Gormley, supra n 1 at para 2.13.
160 Roberts and Hunter, ‘Introduction – The Human Rights Revolution in Criminal Evidence and
Procedure’ in Roberts and Hunter (eds), Criminal Evidence and Human Rights: Reimagining Common
Law Procedural Traditions (2012) 1 at 5–6.
161 Gormley, supra n 1 at paras 6.1–6.7.
162 Ibid. at para 7.1. See Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
163 Section 10(b) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
164 R v Sinclair [2010] 2 SCR 310 at para 27, discussed in Gormley, supra n 1 at para 7.4.
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Zealand of a similar ‘duty to refrain from taking any positive or deliberate step to
elicit evidence from the detainee until he or she has had a reasonable opportunity to
consult with counsel’.165 Note was also taken of a similar practice in Australia despite
noting slight variations between different states and even though in theory there is
no right to have a lawyer attend at a police station there.166 A ‘clear international
view’ was then derived from this jurisprudence, and this was ‘consistent with the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR’.167 It was precisely on this combined view emerging
from Strasbourg and comparative common law that the Irish Supreme Court based
its conclusion that the defendant in this case
did not have a trial in due course of law by reason of the fact that a material
element of the evidence on foot of which he was convicted was evidence
obtained during questioning which occurred after he had requested legal
advice and before that legal advice had been obtained.168
Such cosmopolitan legal thinking provides a fine illustration of the potential for
imaginative legal interpretation inherent in the symbiosis of Strasbourg jurisprudence
with that of superior courts in other jurisdictions, in Europe and beyond.
Equally remarkable is the fact that the Supreme Court’s cosmopolitan logic in
interpreting the Constitution in Gormley went hand in hand with a powerful rhetoric
for the adoption of a proactive internationalist approach to legal reform. The issue in
question was ‘not one which could reasonably be said to have taken the authorities
by surprise’,169 noted Justice Clarke, delivering the opinion of the Court. ‘The likeli-
hood that the State would be required’ to legislate the right to legal assistance could
‘hardly come as a surprise’, he repeated;170 reform had ‘been on the agenda for a
sufficient period of time’,171 stemming from national constitutional jurisprudence,172
‘the well established jurisprudence of the ECtHR’173 as well as ‘the jurisprudence of
courts, whose judgments on like issues the Irish courts frequently regard as persua-
sive, for quite some time’.174 With specific regard to Salduz, Justice Clarke noted that
the decision had been ‘delivered in 2009 [sic] and the possibility that such a view
might be taken . . . must have been clear for some time before that’.175
165 R v Taylor [1993] 1 NZLR 647, discussed in Gormley, ibid. at para 7.7.
166 Gormley, ibid. at para 7.6.
167 Ibid. at para 7.11. It must be explained here that, when reviewing relevant ECtHR case law, the Irish
Supreme Court peculiarly made no reference to Pishchalnikov v Russia, which had raised very similar
issues to those examined in Gormley and where the ECtHR had found that, even in the event that the
lawyer originally requested is unavailable, the investigating authorities should contact another lawyer or
appoint a legal aid lawyer to ensure that the suspect is offered legal assistance: see Pishchalnikov v Russia,
supra n 18 at paras 74–75. Reference to Pishchalnikov would have reinforced the Supreme Court’s view
that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR was consistent with the international position on this matter.
168 Ibid. at para 9.17.
169 Ibid. at para 9.5.
170 Ibid. at para 9.7.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid. at paras 7.5–7.6.
173 Ibid. at para 9.7.
174 Ibid. at paras 9.8–9.9.
175 Ibid. at para 9.5. The judgment was delivered on 27 November 2008.
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He concluded from all this that if reform had not happened yet, it was the State
which should accept responsibility. One could hardly imagine a more urgent call to
the Irish government to now introduce legislation conforming with Gormley. One
could, more generally, hardly imagine a more dynamic approach to interpreting na-
tional constitutions in accordance with international law, or a stronger commitment
to the comparative method. Gormley also sheds light on Jackson’s and Summers’ the-
sis on the acceptance of ECtHR jurisprudence in contracting parties. Perhaps where
Strasbourg judgments lack the clear rules and coherent rationale that Jackson and
Summers aspire to, comparative law could afford contracting parties an effective
methodological tool to tackle areas of complexity. This would not benefit contracting
parties only, but also the Court itself, as the dialogue between them would be
enriched, and potentially facilitated, by reflection on examples from foreign legal
cultures.
For all its exceptional attention to foreign and international law, Gormley is, how-
ever, unduly restricted in the comparative law angle that it adopts. There is no doubt-
ing the logic of the Supreme Court in looking into the practice of constitutional
courts with roots in the same legal culture as it, but it still is surprising that the vari-
ous Salduz-inspired European reforms discussed in this article were completely under
its radar. In reality, what this means is that while attempting to interpret Salduz and
its progeny, the Irish Supreme Court has been oblivious to, or perhaps unwilling to
take into consideration, recent or even simultaneous European attempts to apply the
same jurisprudence. The same could be said with reference to the EU Directive on
the right of access to a lawyer, which the Court has also neglected (or wilfully
ignored). One could argue here that it might be unreasonable to expect the Supreme
Court of Ireland to be aware of legal reform in, for instance, Belgium or the
Netherlands, and that the force of the linguistic and cultural (civil law) barriers to
common law understandings of constitutional interpretation should not be underes-
timated,176 but this de facto agnosticism argument surely diminishes in force when
viewed against the backdrop of European Union developments in which Ireland
actively participates. Ironically enough, it was the Irish Presidency of the Council of
the EU that secured agreement with the European Parliament on the Directive.177
These observations are a useful reminder of the complex ways in which legal cosmo-
politanism manifests itself in the emerging global landscape. The Irish Supreme
Court took into account the pronouncements of Australian courts, where there is
not even a right to legal assistance at the police station, but showed no awareness of
the extensive reform of custodial legal assistance currently under way in the common
law system of Scotland, the much-discussed—including in English academic scholar-
ship—recent reforms in the continental system of France or a bold Directive aiming
to strengthen defence rights across the EU. Even in the event that this was only due
176 For an analysis of the differences in linguistic and cultural influence of the common law and civil law
traditions at the level of international criminal justice, and the lack of interest in, or accessibility of, civil
law sources: see Bohlander, ‘Languages, Culture, Legal Traditions and International Criminal Justice’
(2014) 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 491.
177 See Department of Justice and Equality, ‘Enhanced Rights for Accused Persons Agreed by Irish
Presidency’, 28 May 2013, available at: www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR13000209 [last accessed 24
August 2015].
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to coincidence, and even if Gormley generally showcases a remarkably internationalist
approach to legal interpretation that is in line with observations about ‘the growing
importance of comparative legal method in an era of cosmopolitan legality’,178 the
preceding analysis is also revealing of the idiosyncrasies of modern legal systems’
cosmopolitan attitudes.
6. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Strasbourg jurisprudence had a striking impact on those European countries that,
prior to Salduz, were still not recognizing the right of access to a lawyer in custodial
interrogation. Belgium, France, Scotland, the Netherlands and now Ireland have all
given effect to the right to legal assistance—or taken significant steps in this direc-
tion—under the compelling influence of the Salduz jurisprudence. However, import-
ant variations can also be identified in the acceptance of Salduz in these countries.
Such variations adversely affect the application of Salduz rights in practice and offer a
demonstration of variable degrees of acceptance of ECtHR jurisprudence in Europe.
We must also consider Salduz’s quite unequivocal message, which provides a useful
prism for further exploration of the thesis that when ECtHR case law rests on a
coherent rationale and provides contracting parties with clear rules, it can lead them
to accept its position. Jackson and Summers made this claim inter alia by treating
Salduz as a paradigm of acceptance of ECtHR jurisprudence. But here it was shown
that, despite Salduz’s clear rules and rationale, this seminal jurisprudence has not
been accommodated everywhere with the same level of urgency or commitment to
giving the newly recognized rights full effect. This is not to doubt the intuitive force
in Jackson’s and Summers’ argument, or the empirical evidence that they offer, but
rather to highlight how their analysis presents an important opportunity to view the
Court-centred explanation of acceptance that they provide in combination with
other, contracting party-centred explanations of acceptance. Viewed from this wider
angle, the issue of the accommodation of Strasbourg jurisprudence in national juris-
dictions becomes one that calls into question as much the actions of the ECtHR as it
does those of the Member States. This naturally points to the need for a more
cosmopolitan approach to applying the ECHR. Contracting parties must strive to
obtain a better understanding of the reasons that underpin the development of par-
ticular jurisprudential influences coming from Strasbourg. By articulating clear rules
and a coherent rationale, the Court will accelerate this process, and so will the con-
tracting parties’ own ability to look sideways to other countries’ reception of such
influences. Conversely, the Court needs to develop a deeper understanding of the
local factors that may be hindering (or, by contrast, accelerating) the harmonic
reception of its jurisprudence in contracting parties.179
178 Roberts, ‘Does Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights Require Reasoned Verdicts in
Criminal Trials? (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 213 at 229.
179 See generally Bratza, ‘The Relationship Between the UK Courts and Strasbourg’ [2011] European
Human Rights Law Review 505. See also Rozakis, ‘The European Judge as Comparatist’ in Markesinis
and Fedtke (eds), Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of Inspiration (2006) 338 at 348–53;
Kerr, ‘The Conversation between Strasbourg and National Courts – Dialogue or Dictation?’ (2009) 44
Irish Jurist 12; and ECtHR, Dialogue between Judges, supra n 153. The wide-encompassing survey of com-
parative law undertaken in Taxquet v Belgium Application No 926/05, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 16
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An excellent manifestation of such cosmopolitan legal thinking applied in practice
is the Irish Supreme Court’s decision in Gormley. The decision put forward an inter-
pretation of the national constitution that was simultaneously the product of
Strasbourg jurisprudence and common law comparativism, while also promoting a
robust internationalist approach to legal interpretation and law reform. In relying on
this internationalist approach to strengthen suspects’ rights, and in exhibiting a deep
understanding of the realities of custodial interrogation, the decision shows the way
forward in what will no doubt be a long process of establishing common procedural
safeguards for the rights of the defence in Europe. When called to give effect to
Strasbourg jurisprudence or the Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, Member
States now have a unique range of national and international experiences to draw
upon.180 The Irish Supreme Court performed this exercise to a very high standard as
far as ECtHR jurisprudence and the experience of important common law jurisdic-
tions is concerned. Its curious omission of Salduz-inspired reforms in other
European countries only serves as a reminder of the idiosyncrasies and inherent
challenges of cosmopolitan legal thinking.
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